Kolby Phillip
Edited by Vedanth Ramabhadran
NATO’s 1999 intervention in the Kosovo conflict marked a crucial shift in the legal landscape of humanitarian intervention. It signaled a change in the role of international institutions like NATO, evolving from primarily diplomatic entities to those pursuing humanitarian causes through various physical means, even at the expense of established international law. Despite achieving surface-level success in halting ethnic cleansing and genocide by ethnic Serbs against Albanians and preventing further conflict in the unstable Balkans, the aftermath of the intervention arguably raised more serious issues than the conflict itself.
The disregard for jus ad bellum, or the legal right to war, by defying a UNSC veto prior to the 1999 intervention set a concerning precedent that undermines the foundations of international laws and charters. Despite being driven entirely by humanitarian concerns, NATO was legally wrong. Russia, a member of the Security Council’s Power 5 with a permanent veto, opposed the use of armed force to intervene in the ongoing crisis in Kosovo.[1] NATO circumvented the UNSC’s authority by sidestepping a veto and Article II Section IV in the UN Charter, which “prohibits the threat or use of force and calls on all members to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of other States.”[2] NATO’s intervention in Kosovo opened a proverbial pandora’s box regarding the need to act legally in authorizing international interventions, a concept evident today in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: a militarily powerful nation or alliance can unilaterally decide when to interfere with a state’s sovereignty in the name of humanitarianism.
On February 21, 2022, just three days before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin officially recognized the self-determination of two Eastern Ukraine regions–Donetsk and Luhansk.[3] This decision was met with immediate and fervent condemnations from Western nations, accusing Russia of undermining well-established precedents and provisions in international law, specifically the aforementioned Article II Section IV of the UN Charter’s protection of “territorial integrity.”[4] However, much to the chagrin of such Western powers, Russian diplomats such as the representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, dismissed such condemnations as “double standards,” citing the overwhelming Western coalition that had supported Kosovo’s right to “remedial secession” from Serbia during the 1999 intervention.[5] Such logic is reasonable, no matter how much Western diplomats may detest it.
The main counterargument from Western nationals regarding the relationship between the Kosovo intervention and Russia’s pledge to recognize and militarily support the two Eastern Ukraine regions stems from the overwhelming belief that Kosovar Albanians (the majority of the population in Kosovo) deeply wanted separation from the oppressive policies emanating from Belgrade. While true, Western powers neglect the same logic being applied by the Kremlin to the inhabitants of Donetsk and Luhansk. Referendums were held in each of the Ukrainian regions, with the overwhelming result supporting the right to self-determination and expressing displeasure with the state of affairs in Ukraine.[6] It is true that these referendums were conducted under rather-suspicious methods by Russian authorities, including around half of the candidates and voters in these areas being citizens of Russia that had never resided in Ukraine prior to the referendums or door-to-door intimidation of voters by bussed in Russian armed police forces.[7][8] Despite the circumstances, they are elections nonetheless.
Throughout the struggle to assess the legality of Russia’s justification of a so-called “Kosovo Precedent” regarding their actions in Ukraine, it becomes glaringly apparent that this contention boils down to whether ulterior motives are behind the guise of precedence. International law has faced its fair criticism of being considered “Westernized law” that serves to shift legal power in favor of Western liberal nations, such as the United States. When NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999, they broke legal and policy precedents, asserting a right to protect Kosovar Albanians from Serbs’ attempts at ethnic cleansing and and to prevent another genocide in the region (the other being the Srebrenica genocide in 1995).[9] The same logic is being used by the Kremlin in its ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, asserting claims of genocide and ethnic cleansing of the “Russian-speaking minorities and diaspora” of Donetsk and Luhansk.[10] The question arises: is one’s claim of genocide and ethnic cleansing more valid than another? If Russia relied solely on the referendums held, the “Kosovo Precedent” would not apply, given that the citizens of Donetsk and Luhansk would be viewed as a political group in the eyes of international law—a notably absent victim group from the definition of the crime of genocide adopted by the UN in 1946 and codified in 1948.[11] However, Russia claims that the citizens of these regions are native Russian speakers and are members of the greater Russian diaspora, thus making them an ethnic group, a listed victim group in the definition for genocide. As such, Western nations' double standards regarding the right to intervention and interpretations of precedent set by the Kosovo intervention further define them as wielding international law more as a political tool for what solely benefits them, rather than promoting equal adherence to laws that all nations agreed upon.
NATO’s 1999 intervention in the Kosovo conflict, while ostensibly rooted in humanitarian reasons, establishes a haunting precedent. The allowance for powerful nations or alliance members to disregard the UN Charter and UNSC vetoes poses a significant danger. The legal laxity and ambiguity resulting from this decision have empowered Russia to constrain NATO & EU members (in terms of troop deployment) while engaging in offensive military campaigns in Eastern Ukraine. Moving forward, the international community should continue to frame the 1999 NATO invasion as an isolated incident rather than a precedent-setting event, to attempt to discredit Russia’s justifications. Furthermore, consistent guidelines and practices should be adopted to prevent the masking of military invasions as “humanitarian interventions” as well as to address the hypocrisy embraced by organizations like NATO regarding the legal backing for such occurrences.
[1] Security Council rejects demand for cessation of use of force against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia | UN press, United Nations, https://press.un.org/en/1999/19990326.sc6659.html (last visited Dec 2, 2023).
[2] Purposes and principles of the UN (Chapter I of UN Charter) Security Council, United Nations, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/purposes-and-principles-un-chapter-i-un-charter#:~:text=Article%202%20(4)%20of%20the,political%20independence%20of%20other%20States (last visited Dec 2, 2023).
[3] Vladimir Isachenkov, Yuras Karmanau & Lorne Cook, Putin recognizes separatist Eastern Ukrainian regions, paving the way for military support PBS (2022), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/putin-recognizes-separatist-eastern-ukrainian-regions-paving-the-way-for-military-support#:~:text=MOSCOW%20(AP)%20%E2%80%94%20Russian%20President,Russia%20could%20imminently%20invade%20Ukraine (last visited Dec 2, 2023).
[4] Purposes and principles of the UN (Chapter I of UN Charter) Security Council, United Nations, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/purposes-and-principles-un-chapter-i-un-charter#:~:text=Article%202%20(4)%20of%20the,political%20independence%20of%20other%20States (last visited Dec 2, 2023).
[5] Part purposes and principles of the charter of the united nations, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/25th_suppl_part_iii_advance_version.pdf (last visited Dec 2, 2023). Pg 9.
[6] Part purposes and principles of the charter of the united nations, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/25th_suppl_part_iii_advance_version.pdf (last visited Dec 2, 2023). Pg 9.
[7] Laack, Stephan. “Putin-Partei feiert Sieg Nach Scheinwahlen in besetzten Gebieten.” tagesschau.de, February 8, 2024. https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/kommunalwahlen-russland-100.html.
[8] Bailey, Riley, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 10, 2023.” Institute for the Study of War, September 10, 2023. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2023.
[9] Victims of the Srebrenica massacre: The Polynational War Memorial, Victims of the Srebrenica Massacre | the Polynational War Memorial, https://war-memorial.net/Victims-of-the-Srebrenica-Massacre-4.171 (last visited Dec 2, 2023).
[10] Jiří Nykodým Lena Surzhko-Harned, Why the “kosovo precedent” was a gateway for Russia’s abuse of international law The Loop (2023), https://theloop.ecpr.eu/kosovo-precedent-gateway-to-russias-abuse-of-international-law/ (last visited Dec 2, 2023).
[11] United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the responsibility to protect, United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml#:~:text=Genocide%20was%20first%20recognised%20as,Genocide%20(the%20Genocide%20Convention) (last visited Dec 2, 2023).
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